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Abstract
This article contemplates the journalistic coverage of American espionage as an attempt to maintain
consonance with broader cultural discourses about what it means to be an American. Tracking the American
press coverage of the Jonathan Pollard spy case, the article demonstrates that the press turns espionage into a
phenomenon upholding fundamental American beliefs in openness, sincerity, and straightforwardness. It
shows that, rather than represent espionage as a phenomenon embodying deceit, secrecy, and immoral action,
the press turns espionage into a phenomenon that communicates that one is what one says one is and that
one's self presentation reflects one's insides. Ultimately, however, this representation of espionage undermines
a full understanding of how - and why - spying works in culture.
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Defending the American Dream: Coverage of the Jonathan Pollard Spy Case 
 
Barbie Zelizer 
 
Abstract 
This article contemplates the journalistic coverage of American espionage as an attempt to 
maintain consonance with broader cultural discourses about what it means to be an American. 
Tracking the American press coverage of the Jonathan Pollard spy case, the article demonstrates 
that the press turns espionage into a phenomenon upholding fundamental American beliefs in 
openness, sincerity, and straightforwardness. It shows that, rather than represent espionage as a 
phenomenon embodying deceit, secrecy, and immoral action, the press turns espionage into a 
phenomenon that communicates that one is what one says one is and that one's self presentation 
reflects one's insides. Ultimately, however, this representation of espionage undermines a full 
understanding of how - and why - spying works in culture. 
 
Not long ago, The Philadelphia Inquirer featured a front-page story about a new book that had 
been published by a Soviet defector. The article, which drew on crates of files to reveal tales of 
an espionage center in the heart of Philadelphia during the 1960s, was divided into two separate 
but related stories: on the left side of the centerfold, readers were told of the haven that the city 
had offered for Soviet spies during the Cold War. On the right side, they were told of the exploits 
of Soviet "bad guys, bunglers, bombers and boozers" who had gotten "Britain all abuzz." In 
reading the article, it was the substitution of Britain for the United States as a locus for spying 
activity that caught the eye. Why was the second of two related articles about Britain? Why had 
the United States disappeared? 
 
This article contemplates the strategic disappearance of America as a venue that engages in 
espionage, arguing that its disappearance is in keeping with broader cultural discourses about 
what it means to be an American. As a nation-state and as a culture, the United States is highly 
ambivalent about the espionage in its midst. U.S. public discourse holds that at some level people 
are what they purport or claim to be and that U.S. culture thrives on its openness, sincerity, 
integrity, and forthrightness. Spying, however, taints that linkage, by a priori assuming that what 
one says one is never reflects what lies inside. The internal, private, and subjective world of 
espionage has no reliable corollary with the external, manifest, and objective world. 
 
This article broadly situates espionage as a phenomenon at odds with America's collective sense 
of self. It addresses the problematics of how America, as a culture and a nation-state, adapts 
recountings of problematic action and antithetical public events so as to maintain consonance 
with that sense of self. It argues that the lack of fit between U.S. public discourse and espionage 
is so problematic for most Americans that all talk of spying is strategically dumbed-down, with 
spying represented instead as a "flip phenomenon" in American discourse, a phenomenon that 
paradoxically upholds not what one would expect of espionage as a cultural system—deceit, 
secrecy, and immoral action—but its polar opposite. Within the American context, spying 
becomes a repository for upholding the fundamental beliefs in openness, sincerity, and 
straightforwardness, transformed into a set of practices that communicate that one is what one 
says one is and that one's self-presentation reflects one's insides. Ultimately, however, this 
undermines a full understanding of how - and why - spying really works, and leaves an 
appreciation of its uses in our culture incomplete. When applied to the journalistic coverage of 
the Jonathan Pollard spy case, these issues raise questions about how the collective strives to 
reinstate balance between what it is and what it wants to be, particularly in cases that undo the 
connection between them.  
 
ESPIONAGE AS A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
 
Although numerous kinds of public action present challenges to a nation's collective image, 
espionage - and its dark associations with violence, deception, and subterfuge - rarely tops the 
list of a nation-state's admired and readily admitted achievements. While espionage is not the 
only profession where one pretends to be something one is not - the same argument being made 
for politicians, actors, or anchorpersons - it is clear that espionage has its own singular 
characteristics. 
 
Spying is primarily a visual system. It is a technology of looking that proceeds according to 
explicit and implicit rules about where one is allowed and encouraged to look for information. 
While such looking is sanctioned in varying configurations by the group at hand, spying also 
implicitly refers to that which is not seen. Assumptions about what can be private and concealed, 
and under which conditions, motivate the spy's fluid transport across boundaries, with 
technology and technological change providing a changing background to the changing defi-
nition of what counts as espionage. 
 
Espionage thrives on an unusual communication system. At the core of that system is a tenuous 
connection between disclosure and concealment, public and private. Defined as "actions directed 
toward the acquisition of information through clandestine means" (Fowler 1994, p. 6), espionage 
refers to the activation of a set of practices of information gathering, transfer, and exchange, 
which are practiced to engage in what might be called the management of secrecy. 
 
Although the spy as an individual phenomenon dates to the Biblical tales of Samson and Delilah 
or Moses' twelve spies sent to the Land of Canaan, espionage as a complex communication 
system is relatively new. It bears a number of curious and somewhat contradictory attributes. 
First, its morally ambiguous impulses derive in large part from the violence at the core of its 
activities. The spy exists in a world where usual demarcations between good and evil, moral and 
immoral, underground and aboveground are obscured. Government detectives and political spies 
work on the same line, often with no knowledge of the other's presence. Second, the spy is 
largely invisible and exists within a protected space that removes him or her from sanction from 
the rest of the community for activities that would normally be problematic, if not reprehensible. 
Third, the spy is competent, an expert in every action he or she undertakes. He or she can ski 
well, pick locks, disable machinery or computers, and make love wildly. The spy's errors are 
usually "errors of inattention, such as killing the wrong man" (Barzun 1965, p. 169). Finally, 
spying is unscrupulous. As Jacques Barzun recounted, "The advantage of being a spy is that 
there is always a larger reason - the reason of state - for making any little scruple or nastiness 
shrink into insignificance" (ibid.). Few spies regard themselves as sinister or intentional 
lawbreakers but see themselves acting instead to a higher criterion (Nash 1997, p. 7). 
Each of these attributes is hidden, obscured, known, and recognized, but rarely admitted in 
public. In making espionage work, the spy depends on a number of generally unfamiliar tools. 
Ciphers, codes, cryptography, and secrets all play into the spy's everyday world in a way that few 
outsiders imagine, with secret communications, disguises, alibis, and hidden meetings all routine 
(Pratt 1942). Moreover, the tools constantly change with technology. As one U.S. official re-
cently admitted, the "CNN era," in which news and events are broadcast in a near-instantaneous 
fashion with instant analysis and pictures, necessitates an intelligence enterprise that is "more 
rapid and thorough than ever before to allow decision-makers to respond speedily [and]... 
accurate enough to allow public officials to correct the truncated, sound-bite version of events so 
often provided by television news" (McCurdy 1994, p. 127). 
 
The activities of the spy must be kept secret because they often involve a transgression of 
conventional, usually moral, boundaries. In fact, espionage rests on the manipulation of the 
secret, a peculiar act of communication that manipulates private and public impulses in unusual 
ways. Defined by Simmel as "knowledge about facts hidden to others" (Wolff 1959, p. 332), the 
secret depends on the simultaneity of communication and concealment (Bok 1982; Goffman 
1969). Key here is also the activity of storage, without which there can be no secret. In fact, the 
receiver need not know of a secret in order for secrecy to occur, for it connects certain people in 
predictable configurations and excludes others, who may not even know of its existence. Yet, it 
is the revelation of secrets that continually works itself out in espionage. In fact, it is the 
immanence of revelation that determines the distribution and storage of social knowledge within 
the system that circulates it, making us "care so much for truth that we are willing to drug and 
torture for it" (Barzun 1965, p. 169). This means that the secret is routinely communicated to a 
select few at the same time it remains by definition a communique that is not communicated at 
all. The effect of espionage, then, is only partly in the non-message; it also rests in the potential 
for that non-message to become at some point a relay of crucial importance. Tensions—between 
what we see and do not see, between what is visible and public, visible and private, invisible and 
public, or invisible and private, between what is communicated in open space but understood by 
only a select few—are all givens within the system by which espionage makes its name. While 
these tensions are often "dissolved in the moment of [their] revelation" (Wolff 1959, p. 333), 
revelation rarely occurs at once for all people, but rather gradually, in small increments, and over 
time. Governments and other large-scale institutions are even inclined to keep secret facts that 
are generally known (Friedrich 1972), tacitly acknowledging the gradual pacing by which 
disclosure occurs. 
 
Each of these tensions involves a recognition, articulated or implicit, of violence as the core 
activity of espionage. From the cloak and dagger episodes most actively associated with spy 
films to the varying activities involved in violating broader moral standards, an underside of 
violence is assumed to typify most actions associated with espionage. In most spy novels, for 
instance, the experience of violence is narrativized so as to mark a broader loss of innocence. 
Violence is everywhere - in systematic torture, the actions of thugs, the inhumane arbitrariness of 
officials and bureaucracy - and its effect "is to mark out the thin layer of civilization and show its 
contingency" (Denning 1987, p. 71). Violence's shadowy presence unearths a broader discomfort 
in the culture at large, an uneasiness about its acceptability as a venue for conflict resolution. The 
core presence of violence thus makes espionage particularly problematic when viewed as a stan-
dard for collective action. 
 
With spies, then, what is said is only minimally reflective of what is known, either to the spy or 
to his or her audience. Communicating information through espionage thereby thrives on the 
activation of differential address (Zelizer 1989). It relies on an ability to say different things to 
different audiences at one and the same time. In this, espionage is a communication system of 
remarkably wide-ranging and contradictory attributes. And as I will argue, those attributes have 
facilitated the transformation of U.S. espionage into a flip-phenomenon, a phenomenon that is its 
polar opposite. 
 
ESPIONAGE IN U.S. CULTURE 
 
How do all of these premises about espionage come into play in U.S. culture? How are its 
tensions and counter impulses resolved within the collective need to articulate identity, be open, 
act with integrity, and maintain an equivalence between who one is and who one says one is? 
Spying in the U.S. has come to be represented in a way that paradoxically upholds the flip side of 
the phenomenon, supporting a fundamental belief in honesty, openness, and forthrightness. Such 
a representational about-face thrives on support from many quarters - Western epistemology, 
notions of democracy and civil discourse, and, finally, American public consciousness. 
In much of Western tradition, we have long been familiar with the ocular-centric bias of culture, 
producing the notion that seeing is the primary mark of reality. Both Plato and Aristotle gave 
primacy to sight, and Western thought has been associated continually with visual metaphors 
involving "point of view," "clarity," "reflection," and so forth. Indeed, in Western epistemology, 
knowledge and visualization have become bedfellows in a default setting for understanding the 
world. Knowledge has come to be equated generally with its representation, judged by its 
reflection effect and by how much it reflects external reality (Rorty 1979). Within such a 
mindset, the insistence that what one sees is what one gets makes sense, and it lends credence to 
a default setting in which honesty and openness are core values. Thus it is no surprise that 
ocularcentrism has come to shape arenas of public discourse that enjoy key degrees of public 
esteem, among them law, journalism, and politics. Ocularcentrism's prevalence makes it difficult 
to remember, however, that it is not the only impulse at the core of Western tradition. Aural 
logic, and its concomitant attributes of "dialogue" and "polyphony," have produced the claim that 
we are in the midst of an aural revival (Hibbitts 1994). Similarly, tactile sensations and olfactory 
experience promote different ways of understanding the world and different epistemological 
positions on reality. What this suggests is that ocularcentrism, and its associative claim that what 
one sees is what one gets, thrives by virtue of its neighbors in lending meaning, whether they be 
aural, tactile, or olfactory. Our ability to claim knowledge through visualization depends on an 
array of activities by which no such visualization exists. 
 
Being honest and sincere is also particularly crucial to democracy. Ideas of how democracy is 
supposed to work and how its members behave take shape in ways commensurate with what 
Alexander and Smith have called "the discourse of civil society." In their view, civil society 
depends first on the attributes associated with a democratic code - rational, reasonable 
individuals relying on relationships of openness, trust, and straightforwardness to support 
institutions that are rule-regulated, contractual, inclusive, and impersonal. While such attributes 
constitute the default setting for active democracies, as with Western epistemology the presence 
of alternatives helps keep the default setting identifiable and in place. Thus, by contrast, 
Alexander and Smith also argue that civil society relies too on a counter-democratic code – 
passive, irrational, and unrealistic individuals who activate greed and self-interest so as to engage 
in deceitful, secretive, and conspiratorial dealings that uphold factious, arbitrary, and exclusive 
institutions. If only to maintain the boundaries of the democratic code, the presence of the 
counter-democratic code is crucial for the existence of civil society (Alexander and Smith 1993, 
pp. 161-163). As with Western epistemology, our ability to lay claim to a civil society depends 
on the existence of counter-impulses that are uncivil, undemocratic, insincere, and irrational. 
Each of these domains has particular resonance in the United States, which has been seen in 
many quarters as both an active setting for shaping contemporary Western thought and the 
exemplar for contemporary democracy. In Alexander and Smith's view, the United States "has 
typically been considered the closest approximation to a democratic nation-state. Here, if 
anywhere, we would expect to find the discourse of civil society in its most pristine form" 
(Alexander and Smith 1993, p. 161). It is no surprise, then, that the United States might provide a 
setting amenable to producing a flip version of espionage as part of its cultural system, even if 
espionage itself is counter to what it means to be an American. 
 
However, assuming that espionage constitutes a phenomenon at odds with America's sense of 
self does not facilitate its admission into the repertoire of behaviors by which America publicly 
defines itself. This article suggests that it occurs in a highly strategic fashion: By accommodating 
only titular claims to espionage, consonance in America's self-image is maintained. This is 
because alongside these titular claims, espionage is turned into a flip phenomenon, a counter-
impulse of itself, that supports the nation-state's own sense of self. Its associative traits—
honesty, integrity, rationality—have less to do with espionage and more to do with the default 
setting by which America defines itself. That setting involves a fallback onto ocularcentrism, a 
recognition that what one sees is what one gets, and a valorization of a set of behaviors 
associated with the democratic code and civil discourse. Accommodating the flip side of 
espionage is thereby crucial to rendering it part of being American. 
 
To say that espionage has not been a singular phenomenon throughout U.S. history is upheld by 
a cursory look back in time. The different spy scandals throughout mainstream U.S. history have 
functioned in varied ways. The midnight ride of Paul Revere, America's most noted early spy, 
embodied the patriotic fervor of the American Revolution, while Nathan Hale's execution by the 
British so angered George Washington that he vindictively sent a British spy to the gallows in 
retaliation (Nash 1997). Aaron Burr tried to hack out a country for himself west of the 
Mississippi, but he went down as one of the hated men in U.S. history who caricatured the 
activity of land-grabbing for profit (ibid.). The Chambers-Hiss affair lingered as the most crucial 
political battle of the early Cold War, while the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case, which exploded 
comfortable notions of "pure science" into a Cold War nightmare during the 1950s, destroyed all 
assumptions that technology could be separated from cultural or political life (Walkowitz 1995). 
Yet public discussions of these scandals have rarely catered to the complexities characterizing 
the act of spying under question. Rather, the complications surrounding espionage have been 
admitted only if they can be made to adhere to a larger sense of who Americans are. This means 
that discussions of espionage have traditionally treated the admission of spying and discussions 
of what might be termed its flip side or counter-impulse as complementary, but mutually 
necessary, ways of understanding the phenomenon at hand. With espionage, much of this has 
had to do with erasing or at least minimizing its clandestine, hidden, violent, and obscure 
dimensions. Although the United States took its first real step toward institutionalizing espionage 
during World War II, it was only primarily in the postwar years that the United States as a 
nation-state began to consider collectively how secrecy of a sanctioned and institutional sort 
might look. A sequence of events that included the Cold War, Vietnam, the publication of the 
Pentagon Papers, and Watergate complicated understandings of spying in the public imagination. 
Yet the embrace of spying as a complicated phenomenon did not fit public notions of what 
Americans were supposed to be. Espionage's reliance on deceit, violence, subterfuge, and 
dissembling remained countervalent to the cultural insistence on honesty, integrity, and 
forthrightness. Thus, pretending that U.S. espionage existed in strategic, highly contained 
pockets of its consciousness was easier than loosely admitting the imperfect world of the spy into 
the broad mindset of U.S. consciousness. And it is this strategy that has characterized national 
responses to U.S. espionage more often than not. 
 
SPY FICTION 
 
Fiction and popular culture have been active in shaping the national responses to U.S. espionage. 
The spy of literature has transformed from a do-gooder against the forces of evil to an innocent 
caught in morally ambiguous circumstances, with tensions pitting the individualistic competitive 
hero against the large-scale conspiracy that threatened society (Cawelti and Rosenberg 1987; 
Palmer 1979). Against those tensions, personalities like James Bond or George Smiley 
persevered. 
 
It is no accident that these personalities were British. The spy thriller has in fact remained "a 
British genre, a major cultural export" (Denning 1987, p. 6). As Joan Rockwell argued long ago, 
"Americans read spy stories with avidity, but they read Le Carre, Fleming, and Deighton, not an 
American equivalent of these" (1971, p. 327). British novelists Graham Greene, John Le Carre, 
and Ian Fleming, among others, created a spy world populated with heroes and villains who 
thrived on international intrigue, and their representation directly impacted the fictional shaping 
of the U.S. spy. For instance, the "gentleman-as-spy," a figure that overpopulated the British spy 
genre, never developed a counterpart in U.S. fiction, which remained far more populist by nature 
(Rockwell 1971). More important, U.S. spy fiction never developed a linkage to the real world. 
In fact, positioning the British spy as a model for understanding political and commercial 
subterfuge in its broadest sense served U.S. aims well, for it allowed U.S. writers to create 
another kind of spy in their fiction, one more attuned to the basic values of U.S. public culture. 
The American spy rarely killed or engaged in devious and covert acts. Engagement in the "dirty 
tricks" of British fiction almost never occurred. Created by authors such as Robert Ludlum and 
Trevanian, the spy of U.S. fiction emerged instead as either a physical brute or an intellectually 
dull bureaucrat. He or she was a character whose physical daring or plodding organizational 
skills rated more highly than internal complexity. 
 
Why is this so? It may have been easier to externalize the complexities of the spy onto other 
nation-states than to admit this actor inside the U.S. popular imagination. As Joan Rockwell 
claimed, "Without the image [of the spy of dirty tricks fame], there was no possibility of 
developing a literature of espionage in America comparable to that in Britain where the spy was 
acknowledged, admired, and identified with the exemplary upper class" (1971, p. 330). What has 
been at stake, then, in U.S. spy fiction is boundary maintenance, developing the kind of 
representational template that could uphold the preferred version of the group by admitting 
representations of the spy that fit its collective image. In becoming either rogue or bureaucrat, 
the spy in U.S. popular fiction thus upheld the larger insistence on honesty, integrity, and 
forthrightness. In American spy fiction, what one saw was precisely what one got. 
 
SPY FACT 
 
The spy covered by U.S. journalism has also upheld broader national parameters for positioning 
espionage in the public imagination. Factual storytelling about espionage, as practiced by the 
news media, documentary, and nonfiction writings, has catered to a similar ambivalence about 
the complexities of espionage. Most spy scandals were reported in the guise of the discovery 
tales of unfolding news. They moved from blow-by-blow accounts of a particular spy's capture 
to broad considerations of the impact of a spy's activities. 
 
The template for the spy story as news has been a familiar one. Running in conjunction with 
more formulaic understandings of news narrative, by which the most newsworthy angle of the 
story comprises its lead and is followed by a recapping of the key points provided by earlier 
journalistic coverage (Carey 1986), the spy story of journalism tended to focus primarily on what 
was most sensational about the spy case at hand. It therefore tended to lead with descriptions of 
extraordinary escapades, with the bizarre and unusual dimensions of espionage receiving a 
disproportionate amount of coverage. 
 
It is worth noting that the similarity between journalism and espionage may bear on the way in 
which espionage has been covered by the U.S. news media. Espionage in effect constitutes a 
deviant, possibly immoral implementation of the same practices of information relay and 
gathering through which journalism is practiced. Thus, journalists have tended to de-emphasize 
the similar aspects of both professions, such as the need for legitimation in information gathering 
routines, and to overemphasize the dissimilarity. In part, this may derive from the ongoing use of 
the media by spies and other intelligence agents and the struggles over the management of 
messages between those authorized to manage them (the journalists) and those unauthorized to 
do so (the spies). 
 
In sum, then, both spy fiction and spy fact have provided an unnuanced picture of espionage that 
has prevailed in U.S. public consciousness primarily because it fit America's collective sense of 
self. The spy of U.S. consciousness is dull, sometimes brutish, open, trusting, and simplistic. It is 
a character that fits broader assumptions about how America wants to be seen. 
 
THE JONATHAN POLLARD SPY CASE 
 
Perhaps nowhere is this as evident as in the journalistic coverage of one recent spy case, that of 
Jonathan Jay Pollard. Pollard's attempt to spy for Israel against the United States, uncovered in 
November of 1985, threatened to break down all ongoing intelligence connections between the 
two nation-states. Yet journalistic coverage of this case was shaped in a way that allowed 
Americans to maintain their proclaimed belief in integrity and forthrightness, and by extension to 
support the paradoxical reality of espionage between friendly nations. It helped reinstate the 
broader belief in an equivalence between what one is and what one claims to be. 
 
A potential dual national who wanted to claim membership in both countries (and eventually did 
so), Pollard was conveniently employed as a U.S. analyst in the department for naval 
counterterrorism. Although he had displayed a personal past that was replete with exaggerated 
resumes, falsifiable claims about past actions, and grandiose understandings about his role in 
public and private life (Pear 1985), he was later called perhaps the single most productive spy in 
Israel's history (Richelson 1995, p. 398). The documents he processed, if placed atop each other, 
would have comprised a pile six feet wide, six feet deep, and ten feet high, and they covered a 
range of sensitive subjects, including nuclear facilities in Pakistan and Iraq and antiaircraft 
defenses around the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. In particular, the U.S. intelligence community 
found most damning his disclosure of the sources and methods by which the community had 
traditionally worked. 
 
How did U.S. journalism cover this story? Called everything from "good theater"1 to an 
"epidemic,"2 with Time magazine pronouncing it simply a "strange case,"3 the Pollard case 
quickly earned stature as the incident that had caused the most damage in U.S. history. It was 
later revealed in court that then Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger declared he could not 
"conceive of a greater harm to national security" than that caused by Pollard, maintaining that he 
had "compromised the most documents ever" through a spying operation (Lewis 1987). Yet the 
U.S. news media from the beginning offered a less nuanced version of Pollard's involvement and 
the involvement of others around him primarily because it more effectively fit the reflection 
America wanted of itself in the public imagination. 
 
When the Pollard case broke, it was replete with a scenario that might have come from 
Hollywood. Learning of an imminent arrest from U.S. authorities, Pollard and his wife made a 
secret phone call to the Israeli embassy to request asylum and raced inside the gates of the Israeli 
embassy. Within ten minutes, they were refused entry and forced outside into the arms of the 
waiting FBI agents, who immediately took them into custody. Initial reaction on both sides was 
heated. President Ronald Reagan declared that he would "root out and prosecute the spies of any 
nation."4 The U.S. administration pronounced itself "dismayed," and U.S. Jewish leaders offered 
the stronger word "appalled."5 The New York Times ran a scathing editorial in which it 
denounced Israel's initial claims of noninvolvement as "elaborate nonsense," arguing that 
"Israel's policy of never spying on the United States is a policy only never to be caught at it. 
Israel stutters in embarrassment but not much regret."6 Later, as reporters recounted the "darker 
side of U.S.-Israel ties" (Weinraub 1986), the case was labeled "shameful" (Safire 1986). 
Although Israeli officials initially denied even knowing Pollard, amidst rumors that he was 
probably an agent of another nation they soon admitted that Pollard belonged to a "renegade" 
unit outside the traditional Israeli intelligence community (Hoffman 1986). At first admitting that 
they were "shocked" and "dazed" by the allegations (Friedman 1985), officials quickly took the 
offensive and began shifting the blame. When for a time the Americans - torn between the 
Department of Justice, which recognized a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty, and the 
Department of State, which remained concerned for the future of U.S.-Israel relations - intimated 
that Israeli involvement was more widespread than originally believed, [Premier 
1"A Brief Guide to Friendly Spying," The Economist, December 7, 1985, p. 56. 2"Spy 
Epidemic,"Newsweek, December 9, 1985, p. 24. 3"Tensions Without and Within," Time, 
December 23, 1985, p. 35. 4"Israel Apologizes to U.S. Over Spy Scandal," Toronto Star, 
December 2, 1985, p. A14. 5"Spy Scandal Sizzles," U.S. News and World Report, December 9, 
1985, p. 11. 6"Israel's Stutter" (editorial), New York Times, November 30, 1985, p. 22. 
7] The stake of U.S. accusations was altered as coverage of the case wore on and its cast of 
characters grew. Within months, it included Pollard's handler, an Israeli Air Force colonel 
(Aviam Sella), who had met Pollard while in the States as a graduate student at NYU; a Jewish 
New York philanthropist whose family had long been friends of Pollard's; and a crabby and well-
known counterterrorism specialist, Rafael Eitan, who ran Pollard's activities in Washington. 
Shimon Peres denounced attempts to "foul the atmosphere" between the two countries (Friedman 
1986). Israeli Justice Minister Yitzhak Modai argued that "if there is more to the case, somebody 
has to produce the more. Otherwise it's just talk" 
(Shenon1986).8 
 
How did this mess of conflicting prescriptions and scenarios become a tale of unidimensional 
morality in the U.S. press? U.S. journalists turned the Pollard spy story into a tale that upheld the 
basic decency, honesty, integrity, and forthrightness of all things American. They expelled the 
story's nuances and complications so as to make it a tale that fit the reflection America wanted of 
itself in the public imagination. 
 
Jonathan Pollard: From Money Grabber to Dual National 
 
Initially, two main interpretive frames - "the bad spy" and "the good spy"-  were invoked in 
coverage of the case, each linked to an alternative view of what U.S. culture looked like. The 
frames evaluated Pollard's actions either as an individual or as a member of a larger social group. 
The "bad spy" - the individual frame - positioned Pollard as a rogue, an individualistic risk-taker 
out for primarily personal gain. This frame, though it fit commonsensical notions of espionage, 
did not suit broader notions of self embedded in America's consciousness. 
 
The frame of "the bad spy" connected to an extensive history derived from the cult of 
individualism, dating to the one American whose name was most synonymous with treason: 
Benedict Arnold.9 A bold, able battlefield commander during the American Revolution who was 
called "the very genius of war" (Ward 1994, p. 14) and who later fell target to his own financial 
greed, Arnold personified both the height and exhaustion of U.S. individualism, seen as much a 
hero before his spying as he was reviled a villain afterward. 
 
This individualistic frame for spying made particular sense in 1985. Called by one magazine "the 
year of the spy" (Schorr 1994, p. 3), other cases of spying.8 For Israel, it continued to be a push 
and pull situation. On one hand, it was not happy admitting responsibility for the snafu and took 
months to issue what amounted to a "belated and conditional" apology (see endnote 4). It was 
even longer before the Israelis agreed to allow American prosecutors to travel to Israel as part of 
their investigation. Yet somewhat unbelievably, a few days after Pollard was taken into custody, 
Israel returned some of the documents that Pollard had procured on its behalf ("Israel Has 
Returned Spy Papers," Los Angeles Times, December 20, 1985, p. 1). The result was that no one 
was happy with how the Israelis handled the situation. In fact, it was American journalist Wolf 
Blitzer who called on Israel to "do something to help the Pollards" (cited in Fisher 1986), and 
Israel eventually paid the majority of the Pollards' legal bills. Years later, many Israelis remained 
embarrassed by the fact that the Israeli government had initially denied knowing Pollard.9 
Long before Arnold contemplated treason, one opponent wrote that "money is this man's God, 
and to get enough of it he would sacrifice his country" (cited in Ward 1994, p. 16). The plot he 
concocted: After ten months of negotiation with the British, he decided to give the stronghold of 
West Point to the enemy; the prize: twenty thousand pounds if he succeeded, ten thousand if he 
failed; the outcome: a failed plan. Arnold became the living symbol of treason, living in unhappy 
exile among the British (Brandt 1994). 
 
for monetary gain broke at the same time as did Pollard's: those of John Walker, Ronald Pelton, 
Aldrich Ames, and Edward Lee Howard.10 The template in each case was clear: "me first," or 
reaping profit at the expense of one's country. Over the next year and a half, this stretched to 
twenty-five cases, more than in any other similar period in U.S. history. Infact, four of these 
agents were apprehended within five days of Pollard, prompting one intelligence expert to 
proclaim, in a rather understated fashion, that "it stands to reason there are more spies than we 
know about" (cited in Engelberg 1985b). 
 
The financial kickbacks were high. Pollard's passing of naval intelligence and military codes 
garnered him $2,500 monthly, promises of a secret bank account of $300,000, and even a $7,000 
ring for his wife. Coverage at first portrayed Pollard as singularly driven by his lust for the high 
life, labeled by Time "the nouveau riche traitor life style."11 The New York Times reported that 
he had "become literally addicted to the high life style," evidenced by his having booked an 
entire private compartment on the Orient Express while traveling from Venice to Zurich 
(Shenon1987). 
 
This frame for spying reflected the underside of America's sense of self and created a sense that 
Pollard inhabited a dark, unvisualized world. It also gave voice to the counter-democratic code 
discussed by Alexander and Smith (1993). The "bad spy" depended on a character motivated by 
pathological greed and self-interest. It suggested a tendency toward hysterical behavior due to 
the spy's excitable personality and his grandiose and primarily unrealistic plans of action. 
Though necessary for setting boundaries for the default setting of the "good spy," the tale of "the 
bad spy" could not persist as the consensual way of making sense of Pollard. Had it persisted, it 
would have thrown into question broader beliefs about ocularcentrism, the stability of the 
democratic code, and civil society. 
 
Thus, a second interpretive frame—that of "the good spy"—emerged in the Pollard case, and it 
set in place a social, rather than individual, understanding of spying. Here Pollard was seen not 
as an individual but as an active member of a social, bi-national network motivated by 
nationalism, loyalty, patriotism, and duty. The day after Pollard was caught and taken into 
custody, the New York Times offered a sidebar under the headline "Spying on Allies Common" 
(Engelberg 1986a). It is a "longstanding practice," admitted the paper. Elsewhere, when asked if 
U.S. nationals spy on friendly nations, one administration official was quoted as saying, 
10John Walker, a retired Navy warrant officer, sold secrets to the Russians primarily to bail out a 
bankrupt restaurant. Ronald Pelton, a communications specialist for the National Security 
Agency, was convicted of selling information about the location of secret submarine wiretaps in 
Soviet harbors. Aldrich Ames, who has been said to be the most infamous traitor in U.S. history 
after Benedict Arnold (Nash 1997, p. 28), fed the Soviets information from his top-level position 
within the CIA. Edward Lee Howard, a Soviet desk officer at the CIA, first sold intelligence 
information to the KGB and then defected to the Soviet Union, where he admitted stealing 
money from vending machines and out of a woman's purse on an airplane. 
11"My Country for a Rolex," Time, March 7, 1994, p. 16. 
 
"I would hope so" (Friedman 1985). Within months, the media reported that "the United States 
will forgive the Israelis for the Pollard case" (Weinraub 1986), and Newsweek pronounced the 
case a circumstance of "strains in the family."12 Pollard was an "all-American boy" (Marcus 
1985). Pollard himself testified that he spied to secure Israel's survival rather than for the money. 
He was, in the Washington Post's words, "a naive idealist who intended only to help Israel and 
never to hurt America" (Blitzer 1986). 
 
Unlike the individual gain of the earlier frame, key here was the issue of collective identity and 
the collective gains accrued from it. What did it mean to serve a larger collective, particularly 
when there was more than one relevant collective, there was supposed loyalty to both collectives, 
and the collectives were friends with each other? How to be forthright about those conflicting 
loyalties was at the heart of this conversation. As the Washington Post termed it, Pollard was the 
American who loved Israel too much (Blitzer 1986). This frame brought to light the fact that 
sometimes friendly nations behaved in not so friendly ways toward each other. 
 
Here too the tradition was longstanding: examples included U.S. diplomats kicked out of Spain 
in the mid-1980s for peeping at military installations, an NSA employee arrested during the late 
1950s on charges of spying for the Dutch government, and South Africa's expelling three 
employees of the U.S. embassy in Pretoria who in 1979 had fitted the Ambassador's plane with 
cameras to photograph military installations. The incidents were also repeated between Israel and 
the United States: Israel's bombing of a U.S. ship anchored to "listen" to Israeli military 
intelligence during the 1967 Six Day War, or the U.S. deciphering of messages between Britain, 
France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis (Knightley 1986). And yet, remarkably, one 
intelligence analyst, writing as late as 1994 in Foreign Affairs, posed a question which was 
telling for its presumed moral naivete: "Is there such a thing as military espionage conducted 
against allies, as the Jonathan Pollard case suggested?" (McCurdy 1994, p. 130). 
 
The "good spy" as a frame for interpreting espionage proliferated as coverage of the case 
continued. Numerous complexities at the heart of U.S. diplomacy and America's presentation of 
itself and others, such as Israel-U.S. relations, came to light and were simplified. The fuss, 
argued the British Economist, was "intended to reassure Americans and Israelis that nice friends 
in the not-so-nice world of spying behave like perfect gentlemen to each other."13 As one Justice 
Department official commented about Israel's initial reticence to discuss the case, "After the 
arrest, they really rallied around the flag—but which flag is the question" (Shipler 
1985). 
 
Not surprisingly, then, coverage of Pollard embraced the second interpretive strategy, that of "the 
good spy." Individual gain gave way to collective gain, monetary advancement gave way to 
legitimation and stabilization of the group. An understanding of Pollard as a greedy individual 
gave way to an understanding of Pollard as a conflicted dual national, who tried to maintain his 
honest and heartfelt identity with both nation-states. Pollard himself was quoted as citing novelist 
Graham Greene in reference to himself: "I've never met a man who had better motives for all the 
trouble he's caused." (Blitzer 1986). Spying for money became spying for identity. 
Seeing Pollard as "the good spy" was supported by broader notions that helped position 
espionage as a phenomenon consonant with America's collective self-image. In such a light, 
what one saw was what one got. And what one got was in keeping with the democratic code and 
civil society as outlined by Alexander and Smith (1993). Pollard came to be seen as truthful, 
rational, reasonable, and controlled. He worked in an autonomous and reasoned fashion, and 
sincerely admitted his own dual conflicts and loyalties. He was a citizen, not an enemy; he was 
straightforward and open, not calculating, secretive, and deceitful. 
 
And so, details of the case were somewhat magically transformed. Pollard himself admitted that 
he began to forward documents to the Israelis only when he saw that the United States was not 
telling Israel all that it needed for security reasons (Blitzer 1986). Despite extensive evidence 
that monetary remuneration was involved, the Pollard case became recodified as one that 
resulted from a complicated hyphenated identity. It is not coincidental that this latter scenario fit 
better with America's broader sense of what it was. As Tom Wicker wrote in an editorial just two 
weeks after the case broke: "What's going on here? Not only does the Government seem to be 
infested with spies, but they aren't even the kind of subversives good Americans have been 
taught to fear and loathe" (1985). Even more important, admitting Pollard's conflicted dual 
nationality made his spying less heinous, and, significantly, reflected less of a disjunction 
between who he was and who he pretended to be. 
 
Thus, both the Washington Post and the Los Angles Times offered the somewhat curious notion 
that Pollard never really wanted to take the money offered him (Blitzer 1986). Indeed, Pollard 
was quoted as saying that the money was "Israel's idea... I was never comfortable with the 
money" (ibid.). The metaphors changed: the episode became a "bruise" on a healthy body, a 
"blip" on a graph of rising cooperation (Shipler 1985). U.S. leaders praised Israel's "full 
cooperation" and predicted a resumption of the "deep friendship" between the two countries 
(Pichirallo 1986). Officials went to great lengths to deny the case any kind of context and instead 
portrayed it as a gross aberration whose significance needed to be downplayed. As David Shipler 
wrote in the New York Times: The State Department chided Israel a month ago for dragging its 
feet on promised cooperation with investigators but [now it hails] Israel's full cooperation and 
praises the "solid foundation of deep friendship, close affinity and mutual trust" between the two 
governments. The Pollard case [is now] an isolated event that can be consigned to the 
past (1985). 
 
By the time that Pollard had confessed, was convicted, and was sentenced to life imprisonment 
in 1987, his place as a conflicted but honest potential member of two nation-states had been 
secured in U.S. popular consciousness. The American dream, once again, was defended. 
This frame—that softened accusations of treason in recognition of Pollard's conflict over his dual 
loyalties—reigned in the coverage that also followed his conviction. Pollard "the naval analyst" 
became "the naval analyst who has pleaded guilty" (Kurtz 1987). Emphasis on his articulation of 
guilt reinstated the basic premise that one is what one says one is. Moreover, the Pollard case 
was remarkable because Pollard pleaded guilty early on; there was no case per se to be covered. 
It was here, however, that the discussions became broader than the case itself. To quote Israeli 
political commentator Annette Dulczin: Espionage is to diplomacy what infidelity is to marriage: 
it is the apparently loving relationship between the couple—in this case, the United States and 
Israel—rather than the deed itself that makes the case of Pollard so shocking (1986). 
 
Somewhat predictably, the case did not die a natural death, launching what one newsmagazine 
called "one of the most tenacious efforts ever to win a spy's release" (Duffy and Makovsky 
1999). Indeed, since 1986, Pollard's case has been championed by two Israeli presidents, several 
prime ministers, and legions of U.S. supporters of Israel, most of whom have asked for his 
release. Those requests were tied to the Wye Accords in 1998 (Aizenman 1999), even while it 
was disclosed that Pollard had leaked CIA manuals produced by sensitive CIA satellites (Hersh 
1999). This is not to say that the Americans either forgave Pollard or relented. In each case, pleas 
for clemency were rejected, as U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies remained 
opposed to freeing Pollard. As late as 1999, CIA director George Tenet threatened resignation if 
Pollard's sentence were commuted. When rumors floated that Clinton might commute the 
sentence to twenty-five years, making Pollard eligible for parole in 2002, members of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee complained in writing that any release would "give credence to the claim 
that espionage is somehow less serious when Americans spy on behalf of a friendly nation with 
which they sympathize" (cited in Duffy andMakovsky 1999). But was this so far from the truth? 
 
DEFENDING THE AMERICAN DREAM 
 
How a collective repairs potential challenges to its self-image provides telling clues to what is 
particularly crucial about its sense of self. This analysis supports not only the importance of 
consonance within a nation-state's self-image and the significance of boundary maintenance in 
upholding consonance (Vinitzky-Seroussi 1999), but also reveals the degree to which 
consonance depends on extending beyond the image's boundaries so as to keep it in place. In the 
case of espionage, it is necessary to go beyond commonsensical assumptions about spies and 
spying so as to find a way to reinstate it within the repertoire of acceptable behaviors by 
members of the nation-state. 
 
The case of Jonathan Pollard bears this out well. If Jacques Barzun was correct in his 
observations about espionage over thirty years ago, Jonathan Pollard reflects an unsatisfying 
image of our culture's fragilities. This is not only because he was a victim of "the ambiguity of 
the American-Israeli relationship," but because he was a victim of the autonomy through which 
most intelligence agencies operate. The rule broken by the Pollard case was, to quote The 
Economist, "not one that says 'never fib to your friends' but rather the first in the spymaster's 
book: 'don't get caught.'"14 Or, as the Israeli newspaper YediotAharonot headlined it in a 
somewhat sober wrap-up of the various complications of the Pollard case, "Everyone is guilty so 
no one is to blame" (Cooper 1987). In getting caught, however, the only way to deal with the 
complications of the case that came to light was to invoke a moral standard that would speak to 
the heart of all things American, and thereby sidestep the problems involved in putting that 
standard in practice. 
 
Ostensibly, what disappeared in such a sidestep were all the larger ambivalences about 
espionage: its deception, the violence at its core, secrecy, and morally ambivalent behavior. 
Their disappearance, it has been argued, was a central precondition for the flip phenomenon of 
espionage—its counterimpulse—to emerge within U.S. public consciousness. Not only did this 
maneuver allow titular claims to be made in the name of espionage while cleansing it of its 
problematic dimensions, but it also reconstituted espionage in a way that made it an acceptable 
American phenomenon. 
 
This raises the fundamental question of what spies are for. Spies play a major role in helping us 
determine who we are as a culture. They measure a collective's fears and vulnerabilities, 
constituting the barometer ofits collective soul (Stafford 1991, p. 3). By extension, then, the spy's 
actions also reflect a collective's subjunctive sense of who it wants to be. This is where the flip 
side of espionage made sense. By playing to the core of civil society, it established consonance 
in America's self-image, permitting a continued belief in ocularcentrism, democracy, and civil 
society, and its associated belief that what one sees is what one gets. Pollard, in the end result, 
came off as being far more of a "usual guy" than a treasonous monster. His reconstitution as the 
conflicted member of two nation-states fit the fundamental American premise that who one says 
one is parallels who one is inside. It also allowed the U.S. government to ease its way out of the 
conflict. For when faced with the two alternatives, the prospect of admitting to conflicted but 
honest identities within a positive template of friendly nations was far less damning than 
admitting the presence of a money-grabbing traitor hungry for the high life. Even more 
important, admitting Pollard's conflicted dual nationality reflected less of a disjunction between 
who he was and who he pretended to be. It upheld the basic premise that we are what we say we 
are. 
 
How is it possible that espionage can be so many things to so many people? It may be that its 
referents of anonymity, secrecy, and privacy function as chameleonlike parts of a larger 
recognizable communication system. Though they make claims to be absolutes, they in fact exist 
in varying degrees for varying publics. Spying as a communication system, then, perhaps rests 
upon hidden concepts of gradation that are activated differentially as rhetorical devices in the 
securing of given communicative (and ideological) aims. In other words, U.S. espionage thrives 
because it is able to lend unusual wrinkles to our common understanding of absolutes like 
secrecy, anonymity, and privacy. In supporting a claim to openness at the same time as it 
engages in covert behavior of the most fundamental sort, the U.S. representation of espionage 
upholds the basic premise of forthrightness at the same time that it undermines its 
implementation. Significantly, it does so by extending outside the parameters of the 
phenomenon, using counterimpulses to lend espionage its shape. What this suggests is that 
public discourse may work more effectively at the interstices between phenomena, at the places 
where polar opposites collide, than in recognizable territories inhabited by already converted 
populations. 
 
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to briefly return to the Philadelphia Inquirer's story about the spy 
dens in the city center during the late 1960s. The news article tracked three locations in the city 
that had served to mobilize espionage activities. Yet now, a little more than three decades later, 
each of the three meeting places cited by the Soviet defector has been transformed into other 
sites. On one, the clothing store Urban Guerrillas has taken over the dusty movie theater that 
once graced the spot. Spies for Urban Guerrillas? It may be that the retailers know something 
that the rest of U.S. culture still needs to figure out. 
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